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Shenzhen Xunjiexing Technology Corp., Ltd.

深圳市迅捷兴科技股份有限公司  ·  SSE STAR 688655  ·  brand: Xunjiexing 迅捷兴
USCC 91440300778785072F  ·  Bao'an District, Shenzhen, Guangdong  ·  profile compiled 2026-11-01
1,515 on the registry ¥689m revenue 2025, +45% Prototype → small batch → volume Net loss ¥22.4m, 14.4% gross margin No English website at all
HTTPS yes · JSON-LD 0 · hreflang 0 · sitemap.xml 208 URLs · robots.txt minimal and correct · llms.txt 404

What this factory is. A STAR-listed (688655) PCB manufacturer in Bao'an, Shenzhen, incorporated in August 2005 and listed on 11 May 2021. Its business is not volume: it is the difficult middle of the market — prototype, then small batch, then production, without the customer changing factory. Three bases do different jobs: Shenzhen Shajing for custom prototypes with a 24-hour option, Xinfeng County in Jiangxi for high-layer and HDI plus a volume plant, and Zhuhai for a smart prototype plant that started production in the first half of 2025.

Why a buyer should look twice. Very few Chinese plants will quote a 2-layer prototype and a 12-layer production run from the same engineering file without a re-qualification. Xunjiexing's published claims are specific and checkable in kind: 10,000+ customers served, 130,000 prototype part-numbers a month, 280,000 m² a year of design capacity, certifications claimed for automotive (IATF 16949), medical (ISO 13485) and military (GJB 9001C). The 2025 accounts are the check that matters most, and they are not flattering.

What the record shows that the website does not. Revenue rose 45.21% to ¥689 million in 2025 and the company lost ¥22.4 million, with a 14.43% gross margin. That is a plant buying growth on thin spreads — typically the signature of a new base ramping (Zhuhai) and of prototype work priced to win volume. There is also no English-language website at all, for a company that took 21% of 2025 revenue from export customers.

A · Entity identity — a factory whose registered address moved to an office tower

FieldValueSource
1 · Legal name深圳市迅捷兴科技股份有限公司
English name as filed with the exchange: Shenzhen Xunjiexing Technology Corp., Ltd.
Enterprise type 其他股份有限公司(上市) · legal representative 马卓 · registered with 深圳市市场监督管理局
Registry; SSE listing sponsor document, 2026-09-17
2 · USCC91440300778785072FRegistry; company environmental disclosure
3 · Registered address — moved off the plantCurrent, since 2026-03-02: 深圳市宝安区沙井街道沙头社区沙井南环路446号星展广场1栋A座24楼 — 24th floor of an office tower
Previous: 深圳市宝安区沙井街道沙四东宝工业区第G、H、I栋 — the production site, still cited as the manufacturing address in the company's 2023 environmental filing
A buyer checking the address on a quotation against the address on the factory gate will find two different places 2 km apart. Neither is wrong: one is the registered office, the other is where boards are made.
Registry change record, 2026-03-02; environmental disclosure 2023
4 · Capital¥133,390,000 — registered and paid in
A 2026 simplified-procedure private placement to specific investors was filed with the Shanghai Stock Exchange in September 2026; no completion is recorded in the sources consulted
Registry; SSE announcement 2026-09-17
5 · Registered industryIndustry code 3989 — 其他电子元件制造 (other electronic components), size class large for 2025
Licensed scope: circuit design; production of electronic components; production of circuit boards; import and export
Registry
6 · Headcount1,515 on the registry extract
Implied revenue per employee, 2025: ¥689m ÷ 1,515 ≈ ¥455,000 (arithmetic on the two published figures)
The company states R&D staff at 130+, more than 10% of headcount
Registry; company site
7 · OwnershipListed on the STAR Market as 688655 since 2021-05-11. Largest natural-person holding in the 2026 registry schedule: 马卓, ¥51.573m of ¥133.39m — 38.66% (arithmetic). Institutional holders include 深圳市高新投创业投资, 粤开资本, 深圳市人才创新创业二号基金, 惠州联讯德威 and several employee/chairman vehiclesRegistry shareholder schedule, 2026-03-02
8 · Product linesOne service sold in three sizes, across HDI, high-frequency/high-speed, heavy copper, metal-backed and flex:
· Prototype — custom, 24-hour option, multi-variety low volume
· Small batch — the segment most plants avoid because it is neither
· Volume — from the Xinfeng plants
End markets named: computing and communications (400G optics, server power), automotive (cockpit, radar, charging), security, robotics, low-altitude economy, medical
Company site
9 · Capacity, as publishedShenzhen: prototypes and small batch, 24-hour fastest delivery, 130,000+ prototype part-numbers a month across the group
Zhuhai smart prototype plant: 60,000 m²/month and 120,000 part-numbers a month, in production from H1 2025
Xinfeng #1: high-layer and HDI, 10,000 m²/month of HDI
Xinfeng #2: volume, over 1,000,000 m²/year; MIIT 5G Factory; national green factory
Group design capacity: 2.8 million m²/year
Company site
10 · CustomersNone named. The company states 10,000+ customers served lifetime and end-market sectors, and names no customer, programme or qualificationCompany site
11 · Financials2025: revenue ¥689.1m (+45.21%) · net profit −¥22.4m · gross margin 14.43% · EPS −¥0.17 · ROE −3.35%
2024: revenue ¥474.6m · net profit −¥2.0m
2025 revenue mix: PCB ¥645m (93.54%); domestic ¥497m (72.08%), export ¥148m (21.46%)
Two consecutive loss years. Revenue grew 45% while the gross margin sat at 14.4% — below the level at which most board plants fund their own capex.
2025 annual report; 2024 annual results
12 · CertificationsClaimed for the Shenzhen plant: ISO 9001, IATF 16949, ISO 13485, GJB 9001C (military); products stated to meet UL, CQC, RoHS and REACH. The group also claims a national 专精特新“小巨人” designation and a Shenzhen green-factory award
No certificate number, body, scope or expiry is published on the site
Company site (claims only)
13 · IP183 valid patents (46 invention, 137 utility model) and 38 software copyrights, as stated by the company; 12 technologies described as domestic firsts, including variable-copper-thickness boards. 2024 R&D spend ¥32m at 6.77% of revenue
6.77% of revenue implies ¥473m of 2024 revenue — which matches the audited ¥474.6m. The company's own pages are arithmetically consistent, which is rarer than it should be.
Company site; 2024 annual report
14 · Website and crawlabilityjxpcb.com · HTTPS 200 · 121,261 bytes · lang="zh-cn" · 0 JSON-LD · 0 hreflang · no canonical · og:title present
/robots.txt → 66 bytes, User-agent: * / Allow: /, sitemap declared — correct and minimal
/sitemap.xml → 200, 208 URLs, Chinese only
/llms.txt → 404
Measured 2026-11-01
15 · The English gapNo English website exists. /en and /en/ return 404; en.jxpcb.com does not resolve; the 208-URL sitemap contains no English page
21.46% of 2025 revenue came from export customers who are quoted, sampled and audited in a language the company publishes nothing in.
Measured 2026-11-01

B · Capability — the prototype-to-volume claim, examined

The claim that matters is “no factory change from sample to production”. It is a genuinely unusual promise in this industry: most Chinese plants specialise by volume band, so a buyer's prototype house and their production house are normally different companies with different quality systems, which is exactly where hand-over defects come from. Xunjiexing inverts that by owning all three bands — Shenzhen for custom prototypes, Zhuhai for prototype volume, Xinfeng for high-layer/HDI and for volume.

The capacity numbers are internally plausible: 60,000 m²/month at Zhuhai plus 10,000 m²/month of HDI at Xinfeng #1 plus over 1,000,000 m²/year at Xinfeng #2 is roughly the stated 2.8 million m²/year group design capacity. What is not published: layer-count ceiling, minimum line/space on production panels, HDI order, copper weight ceiling, and the qualification required to move a part-number from the prototype line to the volume line without a new first article.

The 14.43% gross margin is the number a buyer should read as a capability statement rather than an accounting one. Prototype work carries high engineering content and low material volume; if the mix is drifting toward volume at prototype prices, the margin falls exactly like this. Ask what the margin is on the specific band your order sits in.

C · Trust anchors

Four anchors: a STAR listing with audited accounts since 2021, a 20-year operating history, a four-system certification claim that spans automotive, medical and military (the last is unusual and implies a traceability discipline that commercial work does not), and a sitemap with 208 real URLs — a plant that maintains its own site, whatever it fails to publish there.

One anchor is missing and one is negative. Missing: certificate numbers with scope, which matters most for the IATF and GJB claims. Negative: two loss years. A listed company losing money is not a fraud signal — it is a capacity-expansion signal — but it does mean the balance sheet, not the brochure, decides who gets priority when the plant is full.

D · Digital footprint — a correctly built site with nothing in it for machines

Measured on 1 November 2026. The Chinese homepage returns 200 over HTTPS with 121,261 bytes — by far the largest page in this directory, because it carries the whole product taxonomy — declares lang="zh-cn", and contains zero blocks of structured data, zero language alternates and no canonical link.

The technical basics are better than most: robots.txt is 66 bytes of exactly the right thing — allow everything, declare the sitemap — and the sitemap returns 200 with 208 URLs. That combination is rarer in this directory than a green factory award. What is missing is the identity layer: nothing on the page states the USCC, nothing connects the Chinese brand to an English name, and there is no English page to connect it to. A crawler can read this site thoroughly and still not know which legal entity it belongs to.

The gap in one sentence. The plant publishes 208 pages a search engine can crawl, in one language, for a business that takes a fifth of its revenue from abroad and files its accounts in public.

The most useful thing this profile shows

Technical SEO hygiene and business legibility are different things. This is the one plant in the directory whose robots.txt and sitemap are both correct, and it fails the four checks that matter for a foreign buyer: no English page, no structured data, no legal identifier on the page, and a registered office in an office tower that does not appear on any factory gate. Buying from it is entirely possible — the accounts are public and the capacity is real — but nothing about the company's web presence will help you get there.

Other plants profiled in the Pearl River Delta

Four more delta plants are measured the same way, on the same day: in Huizhou, Victory Giant (胜宏科技, 300476) — ¥10.731bn revenue, registered as a chip maker — Glorysky (惠州市特创电子科技) — no HTTPS, registered as a repair shop — and Champion Asia (骏亚科技, 603386) — HTTP-only with three English names; and in Dongguan, Shengyi Electronics (生益电子, 688183) — ¥9.494bn revenue, majority-owned by China's largest laminate maker.

Where this profile sits

This is one of 16 measured plants in this directory. To compare it by question rather than by name — who publishes a layer count, who publishes a certificate number, whether the plant is too big for your order — use the buyer-question index. The rest of the region is measured together on the Pearl River Delta cluster page; the visit itself is covered by the factory audit checklist; the process view — who claims HDI, substrate, metal-core or flex — is the capability index.

What a buyer should verify directly

16 · Sources for this profile