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Screened outNot listed as an available supplier — production halted 2025-05-30, bankruptcy declared 2025-09-09

Sichuan Shangda Electronics Co., Ltd.

四川上达电子有限公司
USCC 91510900MA65HYNM48  ·  Suining, Sichuan  ·  record compiled 2026-11-05
Production halted 2025-05-30
Bankruptcy declared 2025-09-09
Estate in first distribution, 2026-03
Registry status still reads “存续”
Employee claims paid in full, 2026

What this record is for. A ¥6 billion project on 300 mu, 130,000 m² of building, 60,000 m²/month of FPC capacity — named by its administrator as a core supplier to BOE, China Star, Tianma and Visionox. It stopped on 2025-05-30 and was declared bankrupt fourteen weeks later. A buyer asking for “FPC factories in Suining” will still be handed this name. The record exists so that finding the name is not mistaken for finding a supplier.

The trap. The business registry still prints 存续 — “existing”. Nothing in the register is reset when a court declares a company bankrupt; the flag changes only when the company is formally deregistered, which can take years. In this case the plant is real, the equipment is real, and the estate was actively marketed to investors. That is exactly why registry status cannot answer a buyer's question, which is not “does it exist” but “did the line run this quarter”.

A · Entity identity

FieldValueSource
1 · Legal name四川上达电子有限公司
Romanised as “Sichuan Shangda Electronics Co., Ltd.” no company-published English legal name found
Group brand “Leader-Tech”; staff mail on leader-techcn.com
registry record; administrator's notices
2 · USCC91510900MA65HYNM48registry; administrator's pre-marketing notice
3 · Founded2019-06-26 · registered capital ¥300M, paid-in ¥300M · legal representative 李晓华
Wholly owned by 上达电子(黄石)股份有限公司 — the group, not the plant, filed the group's history back to 2004
registry record
4 · AddressNo. 3, South Section 3, Zhonghuan Avenue, Suining High-tech Zone, Sichuan
四川省遂宁市高新区中环大道南三段3号 — a different park from the Jichang South Road PCB base measured on the cluster page
registry; court rulings
5 · Registered scopeR&D, production and sale of flexible circuit boards, high-precision ultra-thin flexible IC substrates, rigid-flex boards, large-scale integrated circuits and electronic components; tape-carrier flexible IC substrate chip bonding and semiconductor packaging and test; import/exportregistry business scope
6 · Headcount1,007 on the 2024 annual filing
A plant manager told a local reporter the workforce had risen from 1,200 to 1,400 in Q3 2024. Two figures, one year, no public reconciliation — see the headcount check
2024 annual filing; Suining DRC release, 2024-09

B · What happened, in order

  1. 2019-05-29 → 2023-12-28
    Built, then fully ramped
    Signed with the Suining High-tech Zone as a municipal priority investment: ~¥6.0 billion total, 300 mu; phase one ¥2.5 billion on 150 mu, ~130,000 m² of plant, offices and dormitory. Production began in Q3 2021; the phase-one lines were declared fully ramped on 2023-12-28. In 2022 the plant recorded ¥810M of output, ~80% of it sold into the Chengdu–Chongqing corridor. 2024 was targeted at ¥500M with ¥250M booked in the first half.
  2. 2024-10-23
    Wage arrears confirmed by the labour authority
    Employees complained from 2024-10-21 that wages had not been paid on time since joining. The Suining Human Resources and Social Security Bureau replied on 2024-10-23 that the arrears were verified; the company attributed them to cash needed for materials on a surge of orders and to slow customer payment. This is the first dated public crack — seven months before the shutdown.
  3. 2025-01 → 2025-05
    Supplier payments stop
    From January 2025 suppliers complained of unpaid invoices and dishonoured commercial paper. On 2025-05-19 the High-tech Zone administration replied that the company had reported working-capital difficulty and no near-term ability to pay.
  4. 2025-05-21
    Special-purpose audit prepared for the petition
    Chongqing Guangrong Certified Public Accountants: assets ¥687M, liabilities ¥826M, net assets −¥138M, and 56 litigation or enforcement cases. Compare the court's own audit below — the two do not agree, and the gap is the point.
  5. 2025-05-30
    Production stops; all labour contracts terminated
    A 2025-05-29 company notice said the controlling shareholder's funding chain had broken, debt pressure had cut off external financing, and existing cash could not sustain operations. Production stopped and every employment contract was terminated from 2025-05-30. The bankruptcy petition was filed the same day.
  6. 2025-06-03 → 2025-06-11
    Case accepted; administrator appointed
    Suining Intermediate People's Court accepted the liquidation, (2025)川09破2号. On 2025-06-11 it appointed Beijing Zhongyin (Chengdu) Law Firm with Sichuan Zhongheng Anxin CPA Firm, Suining branch, as administrator, led by 李高赵.
  7. 2025-06-22
    The estate is put in front of investors
    The administrator opened pre-marketing to prospective investors, registration closing 2025-12-31 17:30. Its own description: 60,000 m²/month capacity, ~30,000 m² of product in process on the lines, core strategic supplier to BOE, China Star, Tianma and Visionox. Notice
  8. 2025-08-11
    First creditors' meeting
    301 creditors had filed 313 claims totalling ¥1,870,449,573.15. After review, 205 creditors' 210 claims were confirmed without objection at ¥143,225,172.20; a further ¥1,643,848,578.33 was deferred pending adjudication.
  9. 2025-09-09
    Adjudged bankrupt
    Ruling (2025)川09破2号之二: unable to pay maturing debts, assets insufficient to cover all debts, and manifestly without the means to pay; no restructuring or settlement application had been filed. Administrator's notice citing the ruling
  10. 2025-11-01
    Deadline for third parties to retrieve their property
    Most of the machinery is held under sale-and-leaseback, not owned outright, so lessors had to claim it. After this date the estate stopped maintaining anything it held and began charging storage: ¥5/m² or m³ per day by area, ¥10/tonne per day by weight, ¥5/unit per day by count. Notice
  11. 2026-03-25
    First distribution of the estate
    The administrator published the first distribution rules, filed with the court, with a comment period to 2026-03-27 and distribution within five days of it closing. By this point the liquidation had moved from “what is it worth” to “who gets paid”. Notice
  12. 2026-11-05
    Registry status unchanged; the group's website no longer serves
    The registry still prints 存续. The domain the company's own staff mail uses, leader-techcn.com, still resolves but returns a 683-byte notice from a Chinese site-builder platform: “当前为试用网站,不支持绑定域名使用” — this is a trial site, domain binding is not supported. A lapsed website is not proof of a stopped factory. It is a dated fact, and no directory has recorded it.

C · Two sets of numbers, fourteen weeks apart

The same company was audited twice within a month, and the two reports describe different companies. Both are official. Neither is wrong.

Measure2025-05-21 · audit for the petition2025-06-03 · court's liquidation audit
Total assets¥687M¥732,839,400
Total liabilities¥826M¥1,507,819,900
Net assets−¥138M−¥774,980,500
Claims assertednot stated¥1,870,449,573.15 from 301 creditors
Litigation / enforcement cases56not restated

Why the liability figure moved by ¥682M. The May audit was a special-purpose report written to support a petition: book values, and the debts the company knew about. The June audit came after every creditor in the supply chain had been invited to file. The difference is debts that existed on paper but had not yet been asserted — roughly an 80% understatement in the first number.

The lesson for a buyer is not “Chinese accounts are unreliable”. It is that a pre-insolvency balance sheet measures what a company admits, while an insolvency audit measures what its creditors can prove. If you are screening a live supplier, neither is available to you — which is why the useful field is not “how much debt” but “is it producing, and who says so”.

D · Credentials — and why they do not help

FieldValueSource
7 · Certificates on recordNational High-Tech Enterprise · municipal enterprise technology centre · eight qualification certificates indexed
None of these is a statement of current capability historical
No IATF 16949 certificate number was published on any page we could still reach — the group site no longer serves, so the claim cannot be checked either way
aggregated enterprise-record databases
8 · Capacity60,000 m²/month, with ~30,000 m² of product in process on the lines at the point of shutdown
This figure survives because the administrator needed it for valuation — it is the one capacity number here with a reason to be accurate
administrator's pre-marketing notice, 2025-06-22
9 · Customer listCore strategic supplier to BOE, China Star, Tianma, Visionox; end customers Huawei, vivo, oppo, Xiaomi, Honor, Samsung self-declared in a sales document
A customer list in a document written to attract a buyer is a marketing claim, not a shipping record. No shipment, award letter or audit report is public.
administrator's pre-marketing notice
10 · Export evidenceNot assessed — irrelevant to a buyer's decision at this point—

E · The part that is not a warning

This is the record where the ending is not the usual one. Court-reported outcome, October 2026: ¥37M of wages advanced before distribution, the full ¥58,089,063.98 of employee claims paid, and more than a thousand workers re-employed locally — the court's 府院联动 (court–government coordination) mechanism credited with the result.

Put it beside the Shenbei Circuit record. Same province, same court system, same decade. At Shenbei, employee social-insurance claims could not be met from the estate at all, and the tax authority said so in writing. Here they were paid in full. Both companies still print 存续 on the same register. A directory that only records failure teaches a buyer nothing about how to read one.

Note what did not happen. The workers were paid and re-employed; the company was not rescued, and the plant did not restart. Employee recovery and supplier recovery are different questions, and the first being answered says nothing about the second — the confirmed unsecured claims in this estate total ¥110.9M.

Why a bankrupt factory still appears available

Four systems keep the old identity alive. (1) The registry keeps printing 存续 until deregistration — which in a liquidation of this size can be years after the ruling. (2) B2B marketplaces and aggregator pages keep the company card and its 8 certificates indexed with no status field at all. (3) Trade-show pages, PDFs and the group's own marketing survive in search caches after the domain stops serving. (4) AI assistants answer from training data, and a 2023 press release about “full ramp-up” reads exactly like a live supplier.

What actually distinguishes this case from a live one is not one record but the sequence. Wage arrears verified by the labour bureau in October 2024; supplier payments stopping in January 2025; a zone administration replying that the company cannot pay in May; a shutdown notice on 29 May; a petition on 30 May. Five public steps, five months, and the register moved on none of them. The method is written up as Is the factory still running? Four public records, two cases.

What we did with this company

Excluded from the PCB supplier list, record kept public. Not ranked, not scored, not presented as an option. It is also deliberately outside the thirteen-plant Suining cluster measurement — that page covers the Jichang South Road PCB base and Mingxing Avenue plants on the 2025 filings, and this plant sits in a different park, which is why the cluster count stays at thirteen and this record is listed there separately, below the table. Deleting the name instead would leave a shortlist that looks clean and a gap nobody can see.

Reinstatement condition. If the estate is sold and a successor restarts production at this site — under this entity or a new one — the record will be revised with the buyer's name, the operating entity's USCC and a date. Until a sale and a restart are both on the record, the status stays as written. Correspondence goes to the address in the footer.

If any fact here is wrong

This page is a compilation of public records, not a legal opinion and not an assessment of any individual. Every claim above cites a court ruling, an administrator's notice, a government reply or a registry entry, and links to it. The bankruptcy facts are the court's, not ours.

If you are a representative of the company, the administrator, a creditor, a prospective investor or a successor entity and any fact here is inaccurate or out of date, write to hello@emssuppliersverified.com with the correction and a source. Corrections are applied and dated, not silently removed.

11 · Sources for this record

  1. 管理人公告 — 要求相关权利人及时行使取回权 — administrator, appointment 2025-06-11, first creditors' meeting 2025-08-11, declaration of bankruptcy 2025-09-09, retrieval deadline and storage charges
  2. 破产清算案意向投资人预招募公告 — administrator, 2025-06-22: registry details including status 存续, 60,000 m²/month capacity, products in process, customer and end-customer list, registration deadline 2025-12-31
  3. 关于《第一次破产财产分配细则》的公示 — administrator, 2026-03-25, comment period to 2026-03-27
  4. (2025)川09破2号 民事裁定书 — 确认无异议债权 — Suining Intermediate People's Court, 2025-08-28: 301 creditors, 313 claims, ¥1,870,449,573.15 filed, ¥143,225,172.20 confirmed, claim-class breakdown
  5. (2025)川09破2号之二 民事裁定书 — 宣告破产 — Suining Intermediate People's Court, 2025-09-09, reproduced in full by the administrator's official account: asset and liability totals at 2025-06-03, valuation ¥296,439,000, owned machinery ¥6,280,384.43, employee claims ¥58,089,063.98, no restructuring application
  6. “有需必应”探新路 “政务提效”看遂宁 — China Development Reform Herald, 2026-10-26: ¥37M wages advanced, ¥58.09M employee claims paid in full, over a thousand workers re-employed locally
  7. 供货三星、京东方的半导体大厂破产清算 — Time Weekly, 2025-06-20: 2024-10-23 labour bureau confirmation, 2025-05-19 zone reply, 2025-05-29 shutdown notice, 2025-05-21 audit figures, 2022 output ¥810M, 2024 headcount and output targets
  8. Public business registry record, read 2026-11-05 — USCC, registered and paid-in capital, legal representative, sole shareholder, registered address, business scope, 2024 annual filing headcount, status flag 存续
  9. Suining High-tech Zone and Suining DRC releases, 2021–2024, as reported — project investment, land, floor area, ramp-up date, daily output in Q3 2024
  10. Direct DNS and HTTP checks of leader-techcn.com run 2026-11-05 — resolves to 117.175.249.45; HTTP 200 with a 683-byte site-builder trial notice, no company content served